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THE JUDGE NEEDS A LAWYER
Frank Q. Nebeker, Associate Judge, District of Columbia
Court of Appeals*
[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercis-
ing the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to
himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with
the possession of this freedom and would destroy that indepen-
dence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or
useful.'
Despite our longstanding commitment to the above principle, a present-
day judge, particularly a trial judge, encounters a new personal and
financial risk. I do not mean the diminished purchasing power of judicial
salaries which often fail to keep pace with inflation. I refer to a job hazard
brought about by the litigation explosion and its handmaiden - the re-
dress neurosis. Whatever a judge does in the courthouse, he runs a sub-
stantial risk of becoming embroiled in litigation where he is no longer the
dispute-resolver, but rather, the object of the complaint. When this occurs,
serious problems arise respecting the nature and source of legal representa-
tion for the judge.
It has not been uncommon for judges to be the adversary when parties
to a lawsuit have brought extraordinary writs from appellate courts con-
cerning a ruling in their case pending before the judge.' But increasingly,
the judge is apt to be sued in separate private actions for damages or equi-
table relief.3 Moreover, with the advent of judicial disability and tenure
* Judge Nebeker wishes to acknowledge the willing and able assistance of Mary Ellen
Craig, Esq. and Cara Nebeker in the preparation of this article.
1. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
2. See generaly Note, Mandamus as a Means of Federal Interlocutory Review, 38 OHIO
ST. L.J. 301 (1977); Comment, The Use of Extraordinary Writsfor Interlocutory Appeals, 44
TENN. L. REV. 137 (1976).
3. See notes 8-38 and accompanying text infra. See generally Feinman & Cohen, Su-
ing Judges.- History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REV. 201 (1980); Note, Immunity of Federal and
State Judgesfrom Civil Suit - Timefor a Qual4fed Immunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727
(1977).
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commissions, the judge may be called upon to respond to complaints
before these disciplinary bodies.4 The purpose of this article is to expose
and explore the scope of the ethical and practical dilemmas created for the
judge by the necessity of obtaining legal representation due to this rapidly
growing phenomenon of suits and complaints against judicial officers.
I. SUITS AGAINST JUDGES AND THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
It is often believed that judges are absolutely immune from damage ac-
tions under the principles established by the Supreme Court in Bradley v.
Fisher.5 In Bradley the Court held that, when a judge performs "judicial
acts," he cannot be held personally liable for such acts in a civil action.6
The Court recognized that exposure to personal liability would destroy ju-
dicial independence, the hallmark of the administration of justice.7 Yet,
despite this long-established precedent, there is no guarantee that claim-
ants are not going to file suit for relief from alleged judicial wrongs. When
a suit is filed, the judge must still defend the action and obtain counsel in
order to apply the judicial immunity defense.
One traditional mechanism through which the acts of trial judges have
been subject to appellate scrutiny has been the writ of mandamus.' This
4. See notes 39-53 and accompanying text infra. See generally Symposium - Judicial
Disciline and Disability, 54 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1977).
5. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). In an earlier case, Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 523 (1868), the Court appeared to carve out an exception to the immunity doctrine
"where the acts are palpably in excess of the jurisdiction of the judges, and are done mali-
ciously or corruptly." Id at 537. Any such exception was expressly rejected in Bradley. 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350-51.
6. Judicial immunity attaches only when the judge acts in a discretionary, rather than
a ministerial, capacity. See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879). Moreover, the
judge must have subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The Court in Bradley distin-
guished acts in the absence of jurisdiction from acts in excess of jurisdiction as follows:
Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, any authority exer-
cised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want
of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdic-
tion over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he
holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are gener-
ally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the
case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the
validity of his judgments may depend.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-52. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-59 (1978).
7. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348-49. See also Smith, An Independent Judiciary.- The Colonial
Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104 (1976).
8. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976), provides: "The Supreme Court and
all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." See 16
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
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remedy is used to confine the judge to the proper exercise of discretion or
to order its exercise where it has been withheld. 9 In Kerr v. United States
District Court for the Northern District of California,'l the government had
sought a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit to vacate a district court order granting the plaintiffs
discovery motion for the production of prison documents. In upholding
the Ninth Circuit's denial of the writ, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
long-established policy that a "writ will issue only in extraordinary cir-
cumstances."" The Court recognized that an important reason for limit-
ing the use of mandamus is that such actions "have the unfortunate
consequence of making the [district court] judge a litigant, obliged to ob-
tain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the litigants [appear-
ing] before him in the underlying case."' 2 One could reason that, in most
instances, the petition for writ of mandamus is only nominally against the
judge. Consequently, it is appropriate to leave the matter of representation
in the appellate court to counsel for the parties in the trial proceedings.
However, the Supreme Court in Kerr acknowledged the anomalies in this
situation and recognized that the judge may in fact have a personal stake
in the outcome and thus may require personal representation. Moreover,
the judge may believe that counsel for the parties in the case will not capa-
bly advocate his interests.'
3
Absolute judicial immunity is disappearing in favor of more limited im-
munity, depending on the nature of the judicial act involved.' 4 Classes of
JURISDICTION §§ 3932-3936 (1977); Note, Supervisory andAdvisory Writs Under the All Writs
Act, 86 HARV. L. REV. 595 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104 (1964); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
10. 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
11. Id at 403. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
12. 426 U.S. at 402.
13. Under rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, all parties in the trial
court, except for the petitioner, are deemed respondents for all purposes. As a further means
of relieving the trial judge from responding, and in recognition that most petitions are de-
nied, rule 21 also allows denial of the petition without an answer and provides for ordering
an answer from the respondents if the appellate court is "otherwise" inclined. FED. R. App.
P. 21.
This is a partial answer to the trial judge's need for counsel but it does not solve the
problem of the perceived less capable lawyer. Moreover, for the balance of the proceedings
in the trial court, one party is in the unique position, for practical purposes, of having been
the trial judge's lawyer. To the lay litigant, this surely appears suspect. The rule 21 provi-
sion of naming some parties as additional respondents does not remedy this seeming impro-
priety.
14. See Stafford, An Overview of Judicial Immunity, STATE CT. J. 3, 5 (Summer 1977).
See also Comment, An Intolerable Accommodation: A Fresh Look at the Immunity Doctrine,
27 AM. U.L. REV. 863 (1978).
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allegations where immunity from suit may not exist include: acts evidenc-
ing a lack of good faith; acts of a criminal nature;' 5 acts in the absence of
authority or beyond jurisdiction;' 6 and acts of an administrative or minis-
terial nature.' 7  Moreover, an increasing number of personal actions
against judges are being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), 1 alleging
denial of constitutionally protected rights under color of law.
The extent of judicial immunity under section 1983 was recently ex-
plored in Stump v. Sparkman.' This suit was brought against a state
judge who had approved a parent's petition for sterilization of her "some-
what retarded" fifteen-year-old daughter. In reversing the Seventh Cir-
cuit's determination that the judge had not acted within his jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court recognized that judicial immunity from damage suits is
crucial to the survival of an independent judiciary. Thus, the Court estab-
lished an immunity rule for judicial acts performed within the court's com-
15. See, e.g., Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974). The court in Gregory
held that "[t]he [judge's] decision to personally evict someone from a courtroom by the use
of physical force is simply not an act of a judicial nature." Id at 64. Thus, the judge was
not absolutely immune from a suit for assault and battery. See generally Alschuler, Court-
room Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629 (1972). See also
Strawbridge v. Bednarik, 460 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Luttrell v. Douglas, 220 F.
Supp. 279 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
16. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1978). In Zarcone, the Second
Circuit affirmed a district court's award of $80,000 in actual damages against a judge and a
sheriff and $60,000 in punitive damages against the judge under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988
(1976), because the judge had abused his official powers. See also Raitport v. Provident
Nat'l Bank, 451 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1978); O'Bryan v. Chandler, 356 F. Supp. 719 (W.D.
Okla. 1973), af'd, 496 F.2d 403 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974); Wade v.
Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624
(D. Neb.), af7'd, 309 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 971 (1965).
17. See, e.g., Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970). The Lynch court found
the defense of judicial immunity inapplicable when the judge was presiding over a county
fiscal court which was actually a county legislative and administrative body. See also Atch-
erson v. Siebenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Iowa 1978); Doe v. Lake County, Indiana, 399
F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
See Castro, Innovations in the Defense of Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 47 TENN. L.
REV. 47 (1979); Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1133 (1977); Comment, Quasi-Judicial Immunity- Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983
Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95; Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE
L.J. 322 (1969).
19. 435 U.S. 349 (1978). See Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman.- The Doctrine of Judicial
Immunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833 (1978).
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petence to act.2" In barring the recovery of damages, the Court reasoned
that judges must be able to act without fear of personal consequences, in-
cluding the expenses incident to a suit, in controversial cases.
2
'
The Court, in Stump, identified two factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a judge's act is in fact "judicial." First, the nature of the
act itself must be examined to see if it is a function normally performed by
the judge. Second, the expectations of the parties should be scrutinized to
determine whether they dealt with the judge in his official capacity.22
While this may be the legal rule, there will always be questions as to what
constitutes "judicial acts" and what is within the court's competence to act.
Thus, although the judge may ultimately prevail, doing so will be a long
and expensive process requiring counsel every step of the way.
While the doctrine of judicial immunity bars damage actions under sec-
tion 1983, it does not necessarily preclude suits under section 1983 for de-
claratory or injunctive relief.23 In one recent case, Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc. v. ABA.,24 suit was brought under section 1983 against
the Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court of Virginia, the court's chief
20. 435 U.S. at 357-60. In an earlier case, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the
Supreme Court held that the common law principle of judicial immunity was not abrogated
by the enactment of § 1983, noting that errors made by a judge respecting the judicial proc-
ess could be corrected on appeal. In reaffirming the immunity principle espoused in Brad-
ley, the Court stated that imposing liability on judges under § 1983 would result in
intimidation and prevent "principled and fearless decision-making." Id at 554. See gener-
ally Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 615 (1970).
21. 435 U.S. at 363-64. Although this was the articulated justification for the Court's
decision, other considerations such as preservation of judicial dignity, judicial authority, and
finality of judicial decisions have been suggested as underpinnings for judicial immunity.
See Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237 (1978). See
generally Note, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct.: A Proposalfor Limited Liability,
20 ARtz. L. REV. 549, 579-88 (1978).
22. 435 U.S. at 362.
23. See Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F.2d 127, 130 (7th Cir. 1971). The question of
whether the immunity principle extends to actions against judges for declaratory or injunc-
tive relief has been the subject of considerable dispute. One line of cases holds that the
doctrine of judicial immunity is not a bar to such relief. See, e.g., Mills v. Larson, 56 F.R.D.
634 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Stambler v. Dillon, 288 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Other courts,
however, maintain that the immunity doctrine bars suits for injunctive or declaratory relief.
See, e.g., Woolbridge v. Virginia, 453 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. Va. 1978); Smallwood v. United
States, 358 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 486 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973); MacKay v. Nesbett,
385 F. Supp. 498 (D. Alaska 1968), affd, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960
(1969). Except for official action in respect to bar discipline, the Supreme Court left this
issue open in its recent decision in Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United
States, 48 U.S.L.W. 4620, 4624 (June 2, 1980).
24. 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded,
Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 4620
(June 2, 1980).
1980]
Catholic University Law Review
justice, and several officials of the state bar association, seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief respecting the publication of information concerning
the practices and fees of attorneys. The three-judge court granted the re-
lief sought and also awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976.25
In awarding attorney's fees, the trial court held that the Act was in-
tended by Congress to abrogate judicial immunity respecting the awarding
of such fees. 26 Thus, the court ruled that, while the judges would not be
personally liable, they would be liable in their official capacity,27 implying
that the attorney fee award would actually be paid by the state.28 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court held the attorney fee award improper where it
was based upon the failure of the Virginia court to exercise its rulemaking
authority. However, an award against the Virginia court when acting in its
"direct enforcement role" in disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attor-
neys was approved by the Court, thereby, implying official liability of
judges in similar circumstances. 29
Suits against judges and challenges to the doctrine of judicial immunity
arise in other contexts as well. For example, the Supreme Court recently
denied certiorari in Rivera v. Cruz,3" a case in which an attorney alleged
that the defendants, members of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, could
not participate in a hearing on his appeal. The trial court had summarily
dismissed his complaint, which sought to void his suspension from practic-
ing law, as not presenting a justiciable controversy.
Another and relatively new risk of exposure to suit is presented by what
might be called a "constitutional tort action," where the immunity defense
appears open to question. For example, in Davis v. Passman,3' the plain-
tiff alleged that a congressman had violated the fifth amendment by dis-
missing her from his staff solely on the basis of her sex. Damages were
sought in the form of backpay, and jurisdiction was predicated only on the
existence of a general federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).32
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of Section . . . 1983 . . . the Court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs." See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
26. 470 F. Supp. at 1061.
27. Id at 1059.
28. See id at 1061.
29. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W.
4020, 4025 (June 2, 1980).
30. P.R. Sup. Ct. (Feb. 1, 1979) (summary at 48 U.S.L.W. 3134), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
143 (1979).
31. 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979).
32. Id at 2269.
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Although Congress has historically exempted itself from coverage under
the various civil rights acts, the Supreme Court held that a right of action
against the congressman existed under the fifth amendment33 and that
damages would be available if the plaintiff prevailed on the merits.
34
The Davis Court recognized that all government officers are bound to
obey the Constitution but noted that some "special concerns" arise in a
"suit against a Congressman for putatively unconstitutional actions taken
in the course of his official conduct . . . ."" Consequently, it may be
argued that Davis, when coupled with the Supreme Court's decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents,36 establishes a "constitutional tort"
equally applicable to the judiciary for violations of fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights.37 The existence or extent of judicial immunity from such suits
is yet to be litigated. However, it is not difficult to imagine that a judge
may find himself required to respond to a suit alleging similar discrimina-
tion in hiring policies or staff administration.38
II. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY COMMISSIONS
There is currently an expanding effort to curb and discipline what is
sometimes perceived as errant judicial behavior.39 This is no doubt the
product of society's consuming quest to police all of its officers." Thus,
judicial disciplinary commissions have become a popular vehicle for re-
viewing judicial behavior.4 t
33. Id at 2276.
34. Id at 2278. See generally Note, "Damages or Nothing," The Efficacy of the Bivens-
Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 667 (1979).
35. 99 S. Ct. at 2277.
36. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court held that there was an implied right of
action for damages against federal officials when fourth amendment rights are violated
under color of law. Id at 397.
37. The concept of a "constitutional tort" was reaffirmed in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478 (1978). Butz is also significant, however, for its holding that the function of the public
official's office controls the nature of the immunity. Id at 508.
38. See generally Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. at 2279 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? (1971); Comment, Judicial
Discipline, Removal and Retirement, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 563. See also Traynor, Who Can
Best Judge the Judges, 53 VA. L. REV. 1266 (1967).
40. As former Judge Marvin Frankel has noted: "Judicial bad manners is a critical
problem which renders a disciplinary technique vital. Although circumstances will not nor-
mally permit or justify removal, the public needs a tool to assert the standards of decency."
Frankel, Judicial Discpline and Removal, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1117, 1123 (1966) (footnotes
omitted). For an examination of cases decided under the Code of Judicial Conduct, see
Thode, The Code of Judicial Conduct - The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 UTAH L.
REV. 395.
41. See, e.g., Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, Judicial Removal in New York.- A New
Look, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1971); Gillis & Fieldman, Michigan's Unitary System of
19801
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Nothing could more personally involve a judge than a challenge to judi-
cial behavior before a judicial disciplinary body.42 Such a challenge is
akin in gravity to a charge of malpractice or sixth amendment ineffective-
ness of counsel. 3 Few persons would consider entering such a risky arena
without counsel, but many judges do so, mainly for financial reasons.
Moreover, it is questionable whether an attorney general or the equivalent
is the appropriate defender of a judge whose actions are being challenged
by another arm of the state - a disciplinary commission." The judge's
remaining tolerable choices are to retain private counsel or to impose on a
professional acquaintance for an indulgence. Faced with such a choice,
the judge may well be tempted to appearpro se rather than face the cost of
private counsel or the embarrassment of imposing on a friend.
Aside from inquiries into personal and private misconduct, there is the
temptation in some quarters to subject decisions of trial judges to review
by disciplinary bodies. 5 While the line between bench misbehavior and
trial error may be troublesome in a few cases, it is unthinkable that a judge
should be called before a disciplinary body for asserted errors reviewable
on appeal. Judicial disciplinary proceedings are not a substitute for or a
corollary to an appeal, and bodies entrusted to conduct those proceedings
must avoid being used in such a manner.' Indeed, one could argue that
judges have an obligation to preserve judicial independence by resisting,
with the force of prohibitory process if necessary, any attempt by a disci-
Judicial Disciline." A Comparison with Illinois' Two-Tier Approach, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
117 (1977); Comment, Judicial Tenure in the District of Columbia, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 543
(1978); Note, Discipline of Judges in Maryland, 34 MD. L. REV. 612 (1974); Note, Judicial
Discpline - The North Carolina Commission System, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1074 (1976); Note,
The Chandler Incident and Problems of Judicial Removal, 19 STAN. L. REV. 448 (1967).
42. See generally Overton, Grounds/or Judicial Discipline in the Context of Judicial Dis-
coplinary Commissions, 54 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 59, 61-65 (1977). See also Comment, The
Procedures of Judicial Discipline, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 190 (1976).
43. Cf. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (disbarment proceedings against lawyer
are quasi-criminal in nature). See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514-16 (1967) (dis-
barment of lawyer is a penalty such that right against self-incrimination attaches and person
cannot be penalized for invoking it).
44. See notes 54-59 and accompanying text infra.
45. The resignation of Judge Charles W. Halleck from the Superior Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia was inextricably intertwined with the disciplinary proceedings pending
against him. See Comment, supra note 41, at 543, 561-77.
46. Chief Justice Ben F. Overton of the Supreme Court of Florida has noted:
To allow disciplinary proceedings to evaluate judicial decisions could force the
judge to walk an ill-defined and standardless line between propriety and impropri-
ety. Clearly, such a sword over a judge's head would have a tendency to chill his
independence. A judge would have to be as concerned with what is proper in the
eyes of the disciplinary commission as with what is the just decision.
Overton, supra note 42, at 66.
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Judge Needs a Lawyer
plinary body to bring pressure to bear when it invades the appellate proc-
ess or threatens judicial independence. By inference, the American Bar
Association's approved draft of Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline
and Disabili&y Retirement (ABA Standards)47 recognizes this proposition
by stating that "[c]laims of error should be left to the appellate process."48
It is disappointing to observe, however, that the ABA Standards have
not recognized the judge's problem in securing legal representation in the
disciplinary context. Yet, the ABA Standards state that a "judge's conduct
on or off the bench" may be the subject of judicial discipline.4 9 Even more
distressing is that, despite an acknowledgment that the judge has the right
to counsel in a disciplinary proceeding,5° the ABA Standards state that a
judge's "attorney's fees should not be at public expense." 51 Moreover, not
only must the judge face the cost of retaining his own counsel, but he may
be assessed the costs of the proceeding as a sanction.
5 2
In contrast, under the ABA Standards, a judge appearing in a disability
retirement proceeding not only has the right to counsel, but, if he appears
before the commission without one, the commission is obligated to appoint
an attorney at public expense to represent the judge.53 It is commendable
that the ABA Standards recognize the public's responsibility to provide
such representation if the judge does not. But why should this policy not
be extended to disciplinary proceedings? Perhaps the reason is that an as-
serted disability does not involve presumed personal fault, which seems to
be the case at the beginning of disciplinary proceedings.
Il. DEFENDING THE JUDGE
Most states and the federal government provide judges with legal repre-
sentation when they are sued in their official capacity.54 In 1977, the Na-
47. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY RETIRE-
MENT (1978) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
48. ABA STANDARDS § 3.4.
49. Id § 1.2 commentary.
50. Id § 4.17. See In re Complaint Against "Judge Anonymous," 590 P.2d 1181, 1188
(Okla. 1978), where the court held that "fundamental fairness and fair play dictate that
Judge Anonymous be permitted to appear as a witness with counsel" in a hearing before a
disciplinary council on a complaint against him.
51. ABA STANDARDS § 5.29 commentary. For a defense of this provision, see Peskoe,
Proceduresfor Judicial Discipline. Type of Commission, Due Process and Right to Counsel, 54
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 164 (1977).
52. ABA STANDARDS § 6.7(g). In a disciplinary proceeding, the expense of witnesses
are to be paid by the party calling the witnesses. If the judge is exonerated and can prove
financial hardship, he may be relieved of the burden. Id § 5.26(b).
53. Id § 8.3.
54. In the federal system the United States Attorney, or a member of his staff, usually
represents federal judges sued in their official capacity.
1980]
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tional Center for State Courts compiled data regarding state judicial
representation. Samuel P. Stafford summarized the results of the study as
follows:
[T]he data showed that the office of the attorney general serves
as the official counsel for all but six states and one territory (The
Virgin Islands have no provisions for legal representation). In
the District of Columbia, corporation counsel handles legal rep-
resentation of judges; in Kansas, local or private counsel provide
legal representation; and in Montana, the Insurance and Legal
Division. The legal department of the State Court Administra-
tor's Office provides legal service for Pennsylvania judges; in
South Dakota and Texas, judges challenged in their official ca-
pacity must choose a private attorney to represent them.
With two exceptions, local or state funds cover the costs of offi-
cial counsel for judges. In South Carolina, either state money or
the state's liability insurance finances any judicial representation.
In Texas, the individual judge is personally responsible for secur-
ing and paying for counsel.
When substitute legal counsel is necessary, all but six of the
states use private attorneys. The six exceptions are Illinois (spe-
cial assistant), Kansas (attorney general when requested and if
there is a conflict), Michigan (special or county attorney), Vir-
ginia (special counsel), and Wyoming (local or state bar associa-
tion).
Six states have provisions requiring individual judges to pay
for any substitute counsel if the official counsel declines. In Loui-
siana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas, the challenged judge is
personally responsible for funding substitute counsel. In Michi-
gan and New York, judges who prefer private attorneys as substi-
tute counsel must personally assume all costs.5
Although legal representation for judges presently exists, there are nu-
merous difficulties and conflicts when a public attorney represents a judge-
defendant.56 The tremendous workload facing every state and federal le-
gal officer is readily apparent. The judge's defense must wait its turn or, if
given priority, other work will be neglected. Consider also that due to the
nature of government service by lawyers, the judge's defense will generally
55. Stafford, supra note 14, at 37.
56. Both federal and state courts have rejected challenges to the legality of representa-
tion of judges by public legal officers. See, e.g., Weiss v. Bonsal, 344 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1965);
Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 628 (1938); Moity v.
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 414 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. La. 1976); Mundy v. McDonald, 216
Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877 (1921); O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N.J. Misc. 1, 50 A.2d 10
(1946); Heath v. Cornelius, 511 S.W.2d 683 (Tenn. 1974).
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be in the hands of less experienced, though dedicated, attorneys. Surely an
overworked, understaffed, and less experienced public legal office is not
the best source for a judge's defense where his reputation and monetary
liability are at stake.
The appearances of impropriety and judicial bias that may result from
the subsequent appearance before the judge of an attorney who defended
him presents a more subtle, but insidious problem.57 This dilemma is not
limited to the government's legal officers; it also applies to privately re-
tained counsel.5 8 But the problem is exacerbated because the government
appears much more regularly before the court.
Finally, the governmental legal officer cannot serve as a true personal
counsel to the judge. His duties are first and foremost to the public and
not to the judge as a client. Clearly, the government's attorney has a dif-
ferent relationship with the client-judge than a private lawyer would.
Moreover, there are significant practical and ethical considerations extant
if the judge is damaged by malpractice. Such a relationship also can be
rife with conflict of interest questions.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the problems created for judges by the existing forms of legal
representation and their impact on the integrity of the judicial process, it
may be that a publicly financed "judicial defender" is needed for judges.59
The busy workload of the state's attorneys' offices or their federal counter-
part, combined with their inability to provide a true attorney-client rela-
tionship with the judge, makes them a less than appropriate personal
counsel. Retaining private counsel is an option for the judge, but it poses a
severe financial burden unless a publicly financed insurance plan is
adopted. This is probably the ideal solution.
A judge should not be left to the benevolent dispensation of legal repre-
sentation by either a lawyer friend or an executive branch lawyer. He is,
57. See Peskoe, supra note 51, at 162-63.
58. ABA STANDARDS § 4.17 commentary states:
While the judge has an absolute right to counsel of his own choice at all stages of
the proceeding, it is inappropriate for the judge, thereafter, to hear matters in
which his counsel appears; at least until considerable time has passed between the
commission proceedings and the appearance. When it happens, the judge should
disqualify himself.
59. This idea was suggested by Allen Ashman, Assistant Executive Director of the
American Judicature Society, at the Sixth National Conference for Judicial Conduct Organ-
ization in Phoenix, Arizona, on November 8-11, 1978. See Hoelzel, A Report on the Sixth
National Conferencefor Judicial Conduct Organization, 62 JUDICATURE 362 (Feb. 1979).
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like anyone else, entitled to have a professional relationship with all the
attendant rights and obligations.
